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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Richard Martin appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania that 
denied his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2). Martin claimed he was entitled to a lesser sentence 
because of Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (Guidelines or USSG), but the District Court 
disagreed because Martin was a career offender. We agree with 
the District Court that Martin’s status as a career offender meant 
that he was not eligible for a reduced sentence. 
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I 
A 
 Martin pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 
distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). He and the United States 
entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), colloquially known as a “(C) 
plea,” in which they agreed that Martin’s advisory range under 
the Guidelines was 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment and that a 
sentence of 87 months was appropriate. 
 Prior to Martin’s sentencing, the United States Probation 
Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that 
differed from the Guidelines calculation agreed upon by the 
parties. According to the Probation Office, Martin’s true 
advisory Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ 
imprisonment because Martin was a career offender. 
 The Government did not object to the PSR, but Martin 
disagreed that he was a career offender and reserved the right to 
object to that finding at a later date. As Martin’s counsel 
explained at the sentencing hearing: “I want to make the record 
clear. I didn’t file objections. What I filed was an 11(c)(1)(C) 
with eighty-seven months. If the Court were not to accept it, I 
have a number of objections.” App. 27–28. 
 At sentencing, the District Court noted several times that 
Martin was a career offender. The Court explained: “In this 
case, the defendant’s criminal history includes separate 
convictions in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 
for crimes of aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and fleeing and 
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alluding [sic] a police officer. These convictions, when coupled 
with his current drug offense, define him as a career offender.” 
App. 23–24. Accordingly, the District Court agreed with the 
PSR, finding that Martin’s total offense level was 31 and his 
criminal history category was VI, resulting in an advisory 
Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. Nevertheless, after 
considering the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553, the Court sentenced Martin to 87 months’ imprisonment 
in accordance with Martin’s (C) plea. 
In its Statement of Reasons, the District Court noted that 
it had adopted the PSR without change and again identified 
Martin’s sentencing range as 188 to 235 months (the career 
offender range). After noting that it had imposed a below-
Guidelines sentence, the Court explained that it had imposed the 
sentence agreed upon by the parties. Martin did not appeal his 
sentence. 
B 
In 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission 
promulgated Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which 
retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense for many 
drug quantities, including the drug quantity associated with 
Martin’s offense. See USSG app. C., amend. 782 (effective Nov. 
1, 2014). In September 2015, Martin filed a motion for reduction 
of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing Amendment 
782. 
Martin also moved to vacate his sentence under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that he was no longer a career 
offender because all three of his predicate offenses qualified as 
crimes of violence only under the residual clause of USSG 
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§ 4B1.2, and the Supreme Court had invalidated the same 
residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (the Armed Career 
Criminal Act) in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015). Martin asked the District Court to defer ruling on his 
§ 2255 motion until after it had decided whether to reduce his 
sentence. 
The District Court denied Martin’s motion, holding that 
he was ineligible for relief because his Guidelines range was 
based on his status as a career offender rather than the drug 
quantity. Martin appealed this order, but asked to stay the 
briefing schedule pending the District Court’s ruling on his 
§ 2255 motion. Martin later withdrew his § 2255 motion after 
the Supreme Court declined to extend Johnson to the Guidelines 
in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017) (holding 
that the Guidelines, including the residual clause of § 4B1.2, are 
not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process 
Clause). This Court then granted Martin’s motion to expedite his 
appeal. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526, 529–31 (3d Cir. 
2017). Because “we are presented with legal questions 
concerning the proper interpretation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines,” our review is plenary. United States v. Thompson, 
825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
6 
 
III 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a district court may reduce 
a term of imprisonment only if two requirements are met. 
Thompson, 825 F.3d at 203. First, the sentence must have been 
“based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2). Second, a reduction in sentence must be 
“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission.” Id. Under the governing policy 
statement, defendants qualify for § 3582(c)(2) relief only if an 
amendment has “the effect of lowering the defendant’s 
applicable guideline range.” USSG § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). In 2011, 
the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 759, which 
amended § 1B1.10 to clarify that a defendant’s “applicable 
guideline range” is “the guideline range that corresponds to the 
offense level and criminal history category determined pursuant 
to § 1B1.1(a), which is determined before consideration of any 
departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.” 
Id. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A). 
The Government has conceded that Martin meets the first 
requirement for a sentence reduction—his sentence was based 
on a Guidelines range that was later reduced. As for the second 
requirement, however, the Government insists that a reduction 
in Martin’s sentence would be inconsistent with applicable 
policy statements because Martin was a career offender subject 
to a Guidelines range of 188–235 months’ imprisonment. Since 
that range was not lowered by Amendment 782, Martin is not 
entitled to a reduction. For his part, Martin claims his applicable 
range was the one specified in his (C) plea (70–87 months). And 
because Amendment 782 lowered that range to 57 to 71 months, 
it follows that Martin is eligible for a sentence reduction. 
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As we shall explain, Martin’s applicable Guidelines 
range was the career offender range. Accordingly, the District 
Court was correct to find him ineligible for a sentence reduction. 
A 
Relying principally on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011), Martin argues 
that the sentencing range set forth in the parties’ plea agreement 
is the sole focus of the § 3582(c)(2) eligibility inquiry. In 
Freeman, the Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant 
sentenced pursuant to a (C) plea was eligible for a sentence 
reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 525 (plurality opinion). The 
specific question was whether such a sentence was “based on” 
the Sentencing Guidelines for purposes of § 3582(c)(2). Id. The 
Supreme Court held that a sentence imposed following a (C) 
plea is “based on” the Guidelines if the agreement “expressly 
uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged 
offense to establish the term of imprisonment,” and that 
sentencing range was subsequently lowered. Id. at 534 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). We have held that 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence expresses the holding of the 
Court because its holding is narrower than the plurality’s. United 
States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Martin’s case differs from Freeman in two important 
respects. For starters, the Government has conceded that 
Martin’s sentence was “based on” the subsequently-lowered 
drug Guidelines, which was the central issue in Freeman. 
Second, Martin qualified as a career offender under the 
Guidelines, whereas Freeman did not address the career 
offender issue at all. The question here is whether the parties’ 
agreement that Martin’s sentence should be based on the drug 
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Guidelines and the District Court’s acceptance of that agreement 
changed Martin’s “applicable guideline range” from the career 
offender range to the drug offense range. 
Although this Court has not yet addressed the question 
presented, two of our sister courts have done so persuasively. In 
United States v. Leonard, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit considered the Guidelines range applicable to a 
defendant who pleaded guilty pursuant to a (C) plea, for 
purposes of determining § 3582(c)(2) eligibility. 844 F.3d 102, 
104 (2d Cir. 2016). The defendant claimed his applicable range 
was that specified in his plea agreement. Id. at 112. The 
government argued that the applicable range was the one 
initially calculated by the district court before it accepted the (C) 
plea. Id. The Second Circuit agreed with the government, 
holding that the applicable range was “that determined by the 
court as set forth in the Guidelines, without regard to the parties’ 
agreement to a different calculation, and before the exercise of 
any departure or variance discretion.” Id. at 113. After 
reviewing the definition of “applicable guideline range” in 
§ 1B1.10, the court explained: “[W]hen a district court accepts 
an 11(c)(1)(C) sentence or sentencing range that is lower than its 
calculated Guidelines range, what the court effectively does is 
grant a departure or variance.” Id. Thus, it concluded that the 
applicable Guideline range is the one determined by the 
sentencing court rather than the parties’ agreement. Id. at 117. 
In United States v. Pleasant, the Ninth Circuit considered 
a situation even more similar to Martin’s case. 704 F.3d 808 (9th 
Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Davis, 825 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). There the 
defendant pleaded guilty to drug possession after reaching an 
agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). That 
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agreement recognized that the defendant was a career offender, 
but “provided instead that his sentence should be at the low end 
of the guidelines applicable to crack-cocaine offenses.” Id. at 
809. The district court accepted the (C) plea and sentenced the 
defendant accordingly at the low end of the Guidelines. In light 
of subsequent amendments to the Guidelines, the defendant 
moved to reduce his sentence, and the district court granted the 
motion, relying on Freeman. See id. at 810. The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the defendant’s applicable Guidelines 
range was that of career offenders. Id. at 813–14. It explained 
that the defendant “was only able to avoid the Career Offender 
guidelines because the district court granted a downward 
variance” by accepting the plea agreement. Id. at 812.1 
These decisions comport with our precedent considering 
the interplay between the career offender Guidelines and 
subsequently-lowered drug Guidelines. In United States v. 
Flemming, 723 F.3d 407 (3d Cir. 2013), for example, the 
defendant was subject to the career offender designation, but 
received a downward departure under § 4A1.3. In that case, we 
held that the “applicable guideline range” for defendants 
designated as career offenders “is the range calculated pursuant 
                                                 
1 The Ninth Circuit found further support in USSG 
§ 6B1.2 (“Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreements”), 
which allows a court to accept (C) plea if “the agreed sentence 
is outside the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons.” 
Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 812. Because this provision clearly 
distinguishes between the “applicable guideline range” and the 
“agreed sentence,” it “confirms that a defendant’s applicable 
range is distinct from the range agreed to in a plea agreement.” 
Id. 
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to the career offender designation of § 4B1.1, and not the range 
calculated after applying any departure or variance.” Id. at 412; 
see also Thompson, 825 F.3d at 204 (“Appellants acknowledge 
that, after Amendment 759, their ‘applicable guideline ranges’ 
under the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in 
§ 1B1.10 are their Career Offender Guidelines ranges.”); United 
States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527, 531–32 (3d Cir. 2012) (“All 
parties to these appeals agree” that “the ‘applicable guideline 
range’ for [defendants] would be the guideline range reflecting 
their career offender designations, which were not affected by 
Amendment 750.”); United States v. Barney, 672 F.3d 228, 
231–32 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s conclusion that 
“applicable guideline range” was career offender range and not 
post-departure drug range). 
B 
Like the defendants in Leonard and Pleasant, Martin 
argues that Freeman demands a different conclusion. In 
Freeman, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence stated: “Because it is 
the parties’ agreement that controls in the (C) agreement 
context, . . . even if the District Court had calculated the range 
differently than the parties, . . . [the defendant] would still be 
eligible for resentencing, as long as the parties’ chosen range 
was one that was ‘subsequently . . . lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission.’” 564 U.S. at 542 n.8 (fourth alteration in original) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)); see also United States v. 
Smith, 658 F.3d 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion in Freeman makes it clear that where the parties have 
entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that is based on 
the Sentencing Guidelines, the applicable Guidelines range for 
purposes of § 3582(c) is the one provided in the plea 
agreement.”). Based on this language in Freeman, Martin 
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contends that the terms of his (C) plea alone should govern the 
§ 3582(c)(2) eligibility analysis. We do not agree that Freeman 
compels such a result.  
As discussed, Freeman established that a defendant’s 
sentence is “based on” the Guidelines agreed to in the parties’ 
(C) plea. 564 U.S. at 538–39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Freeman did not, however, decide what constitutes 
the “applicable guideline range” for purposes of a § 3582(c)(2) 
reduction. The stipulated sentence in the parties’ agreement was 
within the Guidelines range calculated by the district court, and 
that range had been lowered by retroactive amendment. Id. at 
527–28 (plurality opinion). 
For that reason, Freeman sheds no light on how to 
identify the “applicable guideline range” when the district court 
calculates that range differently from the parties in their (C) 
plea, and the controlling concurrence’s footnote considering 
such a circumstance “is at best dictum.” Leonard, 844 F.3d at 
114. Moreover, after Freeman was decided, the Sentencing 
Commission issued Amendment 759, which defined “applicable 
guideline range” as the range calculated before any departure or 
variance. See USSG § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A). As the Second 
Circuit explained, this amendment provided for the court to 
calculate the applicable range according to the Guidelines 
Manual and “does not contemplate that the parties will 
themselves identify the applicable Guidelines range, much less 
that they will do so differently than the district court.” Leonard, 
844 F.3d at 115; see also Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 813 (“Freeman 
did not hold that a defendant’s agreed sentencing range is 
necessarily the same as his applicable sentencing range and, 
even if it did, Freeman would have been abrogated by 
Amendment 759’s clarification of the definition of ‘applicable 
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guidelines.’”); Ware, 694 F.3d at 534 n.4 (“Freeman was 
decided prior to the amendment of the Guidelines commentary 
that added the language at issue in these appeals.”). 
As determined by the District Court, Martin’s applicable 
Guidelines range was the career offender range of 188 to 235 
months. And because that range has not been lowered by any 
amendment to the Guidelines, Martin was not eligible for a 
sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
